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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the international experience in the procurement of reactive power and other 
electricity ancillary services. It involves system operators from different jurisdictions including 
Australia, the United States and Great Britain. The paper evaluates the different procurement 
mechanisms and related compensation schemes. In addition, it also appraises a novel approach (from 
the Power Potential initiative in the UK) for contracting reactive power services from distributed 
energy resources (DERs) using a market-based mechanism. The conceptual auction design applicable 
to the procurement of reactive power is also discussed. Our findings suggest that competition in 
reactive power is very limited in comparison with other ancillary services such as frequency regulation 
and capacity reserves. The introduction of more market oriented mechanisms and resources (such as 
DERs) for acquiring reactive and active power services by the system operator opens new 
opportunities and new ways to deal with voltage stability issues. Power Potential brings the 
opportunity to trial the technical and commercial solution, new roles and new interactions required 
in the introduction of a competitive reactive power market.    
 
1. Introduction  
Reactive power is necessary to maintain the local electricity network voltage within the required limits 
to secure the proper operation of the electrical power equipment.  The voltage limit requirements can 
be altered by the different components of the power system such as loads and transformers (that 
normally absorb reactive power), overhead lines (that may either absorb reactive power with heavy 
loads or supply reactive power with light loads) and underground cables (that generate reactive 
power, Kundur (1994)). Different reactive power sources (ideally in the same place where it is 
consumed) are required to support the imbalance. Reactive power represents both the problem and 
the solution to network voltage issues (Sauer, 2005). At transmission level, reactive power is one of 
                                                          
1 Corresponding author, email: k.anaya@jbs.cam.ac.uk. 
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3 The authors would like to acknowledge the support from AEMO, CAISO, ISO-NE, NYISO, PJM, SCE, UK Power 
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acknowledge the financial support of National Grid via the Electricity Network Innovation Competition (NIC) 
Power Potential Project. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the 
EPRG or any other organisation that is also involved in the Power Potential project. 
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the non-frequency ancillary services that system operators need to procure in order to control and 
balance the transmission system. Reactive power remuneration schemes by system operators (e.g. 
cost-based with fixed rates, bilateral agreements, tenders) only started to play a major role relatively 
recently in liberalised power markets (Mahesh and Kamaraj, 2016).  
The increase of renewable electricity generation leads to higher demand for reactive power (Dierkes 
et al., 2014) and to higher direct costs (Simshauer, 2011) due to the need to add reactive capabilities 
to the existing and new renewable generation. Among the sources of reactive power are the use of 
power electronic converters in wind generation and inverters in solar PV. The upward trend of 
distributed energy resources (DERs)4 is challenging both the transmission and distribution systems by 
altering traditional grid operation. The transition to a more decentralised and flexible energy system 
reflected in the adoption of specific national/state policies (e.g. DER Roadmap in New York, DER Action 
Plan in California, UK Renewable Energy Roadmap, Roadmap to Renewables in Australia) and the 
declining cost of DER technologies are contributing to DER expansion. DERs (aggregated or individual 
connected) often participate in both wholesale and retail electricity markets. This allows DERs to 
deliver greater benefits due to the provision of multiple services, including ancillary services, such as 
reactive power (NYISO, 2017b).  
The majority of the current literature in reactive power is concentrated on the technical or economic 
aspects of reactive capability from different resources and enhanced procurement methods. Some 
studies evaluate the impact of the grid integration of intermittent generation on reactive power in 
terms of quality issues and planning (Hemmati et al., 2014; Pathak et al., 2015; Saquib and Saleem, 
2015).  Other studies assess the capability of DERs in the provision of reactive power to utilities and 
microgrids (Gandhi et al, 2018a; Gayatri et al., 2018). Others evaluate the current methods for reactive 
power compensation and propose enhanced methodologies including the optimisation of active and 
reactive power costs (Ahmadi and Foroud, 2016; Samet, 2016; Ahmadimanesh and Kalantar, 2017). A 
different group of studies explore competitive market models for reactive power procurement for 
long and short term supply using optimisation algorithms (Zhong and Bhattacharya, 2002; El-Samahy 
et al., 2008; Frias et al., 2008). Due to the proliferation of DERs, different studies evaluate also the 
capabilities and influence of solar PV inverters in reactive power and voltage support (Kabiri et al., 
2014, Molina-Garcia et al., 2017; Gandhi, et al., 2018b). A limited number of studies refer to specific 
surveys of ancillary services including reactive power (Rebours et al., 2007) and others concentrate 
only on contestable ancillary services such as regulation and reserves (Zhou et al., 2016). However, 
current trends and new developments in the management and procurement of reactive power 
(including compensation schemes, enhanced network codes, role of DERs), and the procurement of 
reactive power services by system operators from DERs using markets-based mechanisms and their 
associated market design, need further discussion in the current literature about reactive power.   
This study looks at the international experience in the management, procurement and compensation 
mechanisms for reactive power in its role of supporting system operation as an ancillary service. We 
look at system operators from Australia, USA and GB. It also explores a pioneering initiative (the Power 
Potential trial) that is being implemented by National Grid (the Transmission Electricity System 
                                                          
4 DERs have been usually associated with facilities connected to the distribution system (NERC, 2017; FERC, 
2018a). The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) has proposed a more open definition but keeping 
at the same time the concept of small resource (limited capacity). DERs are defined as “resources qualified to 
participate in NYISO’s Energy, Ancillary Services, and/or Capacity markets that are (1) capable of changing its 
load, or (ii) capable of injecting 20 MW or less onto the transmission and/or distribution system, at the NYISO’s 
direction” (NYISO, 2017b, p.10). 
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Operator for GB) and UK Power Networks (the largest Distribution Network Operator (DNO) in UK). 
Power Potential seeks to contract with DERs for the provision of reactive and active power services in 
the southern region of GB (in and around London) using a competitive mechanism (i.e. auctions). Some 
specific lessons are identified for the future procurement of reactive power by system operators from 
DERs using market-based mechanisms. According to FERC (2005, p.15), simulation and 
experimentation is required to understand the effects of a new proposal of auction market design for 
reactive power.   
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the basics of reactive power, its role as an 
ancillary service, key upgrades in network codes that enhance DER reactive power capabilities and the 
future role of DERs in reactive power support and other markets. Section 3 explores current methods 
for managing and procuring reactive power by selected system operators in Australia, the USA and 
GB. Section 4 describes the Power Potential initiative. Section 5 discusses the main findings of this 
study and the lessons for the procurement of reactive power using market-based mechanisms.  
Section 6 concludes.  
2. About Reactive Power  
2.1 The Basics of Reactive Power 
 
The instantaneous power signal in an AC power supply system can be decomposed into two signals: 
reactive power and active power (real or true power). In contrast with active power (expressed in 
Watts), reactive power (expressed in Volt-Amperes Reactive) does not involve a transfer of energy. 
Reactive power is transferred from the source to the load and then returns from the load to the 
source, then the average power supplied is zero. This means contrary to active power, reactive power 
is positive during one half cycle and negative during another half cycle on the AC waveform (Chapman, 
2005). Reactive power (Q) is produced in an AC circuit when the current and voltage waveforms are 
not in phase.  This dephasing reduces the active power (P) output5. Then, reactive power 
compensation is required to keep the system voltage within appropriate limits. These limits can be 
controlled by devices with leading power factor – PF (increasing system voltage) or lagging PF 
(lowering system voltage). In the first case reactive power is supplied to the system and in the second 
one reactive power is consumed by the device6. Among the sources that can generate or absorb 
reactive power are generators (by operating a range of leading/lagging PFs in order to meet voltage 
schedules)7, synchronous condensers (generators that have been disconnected and provide only 
reactive power using real power from the system), transmission or distribution system equipment 
(shunt capacitors, shunt reactors, series capacitors, Flexible Alternating Current Transmission System 
- FACTS8- (Kundur, 1994)). Among other sources are demand response (by regulating the PF at the 
delivery point), energy storage (that would depend on its ability to store/hold electric energy and the 
                                                          
5 𝑆2 = 𝑃2 + 𝑄2 (𝐸𝑞. 1), where S: apparent power (MVA). If the dephasing is zero then 𝑃 = 𝑆 otherwise, 𝑃 <
𝑆.  
6 𝑃𝐹 =
𝑃
𝑆
 (𝐸𝑞. 2),  𝑆 = 𝐼 ∗ 𝑉 (𝐸𝑞. 3), then from (𝐸𝑞 1, 2): 𝑄 = (
𝑃
𝑃𝐹
) ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝐹2)0.5, where S: apparent power 
(MVA), P: real power (MW), Q: reactive power (Mvar), I: current, V: voltage. If 𝑃𝐹 = 1 then I and V are in phase 
and 𝑄 = 0. If a generator operates with a PF of 0.95 leading it means that the generator exports 0.3 Mvar 
(leading reactive power) to the system for every MW of real power produced. On the other hand, if the generator 
operates with a PF of 0.95 lagging it means that the generator consumes 0.3 Mvar (lagging reactive power) for 
every MW of real power produced.   
7 Synchronous generators are the most common source for reactive power and voltage control (Sauer, 2005). 
8 Static Var Compensators (SVC) and Static Compensator (STATCOM) are specific types of FACTS.  
 
  4 
   
 
equipment that connects the storage device with the grid) (FERC, 2014). Network reconfiguration can 
be also an option.    
Depending on the speed and capacity to absorb or produce reactive power, reactive power can be 
classified as dynamic (active) or static (passive). Dynamic reactive sources such as generators, 
synchronous condensers, FACTS) are used to adapt to rapidly changing conditions in response to an 
event or disturbance and are automatically adjusted. Static reactive resources (such as shunt 
capacitors and reactors, and series capacitors) respond to slow and more predictable changing system 
conditions, are used to provide normal voltage support and are permanently connected to the 
transmission/distribution system or switched. Dynamic reactive power sources provide continuously 
variable voltage control capability while static can supply only fixed amounts of reactive power 
(Kundur, 1994, NERC, 2009, FERC, 2014). Dynamic devices require higher capital costs than the static 
ones. For instance a STATCOM of 200 Mvar can be between 3 and 5 times more expensive than a 
shunt reactor that provides the same units of Mvars, NG-UK Power Networks (2016).  
2.2. Reactive Power as an Ancillary Service 
 
Reactive power is one kind of ancillary service that system operators need to procure to maintain 
network stability within the right voltage limits. Reactive power ancillary service constitutes a 
separated market from active power market9.  
Traditionally system operators have the primary responsibility to acquire these services mainly from 
generators (independent or affiliated) using dispatch instructions (voltage schedule), however some 
exceptions may apply.  In Australia, the primary responsibility is given to Transmission Network Service 
Operators instead, see section 3.1 for further details. An intermediate approach is observed in PJM 
where the transmission providers administer the purchases and sales of reactive power supply with 
PJM as a counterparty (PJM, 2018).  
In contrast with other ancillary services such as regulation or reserves where market-based 
mechanisms are used for their acquisition, reactive power is less exposed to competitive mechanisms. 
For instance, Independent System Operators (ISOs) from the USA and Australia procure operating 
reserves together with energy when clearing either day-ahead market, real-time market or both 
markets (EPRI, 2016). This practice is called co-optimisation which results in better price formation 
and brings important savings, a reduction of 30-50% of ancillary services costs (Read, 2010). Some 
initial ideas of co-optimisation are emerging in Europe based on the EU Guideline on electricity 
balancing (EC, 2017). In GB, where some ‘Response and Reserve’ products (e.g. Fast Reserve, Firm 
Frequency Response and Short Term Operating Reserves - STOR) are acquired by National Grid using 
tenders, co-optimisation has not been put in practice yet. Table 1 compares the different ancillary 
services procured by ISOs from the USA and the Transmission System Operator (TSO) from GB.       
There are limited competitive mechanisms for the procurement of reactive power. Reactive Power 
services are not incorporated in the dispatch process and are usually provided under mandatory 
procurement. Among the reasons for this are the local nature of reactive power (“Vars do not travel 
well”), the limited number of potential providers and technological and modelling issues (IES, 2017).  
                                                          
9 System operators classify reactive power as a separated market with specific rules for procuring it. These are 
often based on non-competitive mechanisms (e.g. under a mandatory approach) and rarely on competitive 
mechanisms; in contrast to those competitive mechanisms that apply to active power (procured in real time or 
day-ahead). 
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Table 1: A Comparison of Ancillary Services in the USA and GB (selected services) 
 
 
 
In addition, the procurement of reactive power (along with black start and over frequency reserve) on 
a half-hour clearing market process could be “uneconomic” to procure (EA, 2016).   
 
At the distribution level, there is no currently (July 2018) reported procurement of reactive power 
services using competitive mechanisms for use locally or by the transmission system. However, this 
could change in the near future when a more active role for distribution system operators (DSOs) 
GB
Ancillary service markets and names CAISO ISO-NE MISO PJM SPP NYISO ERCOT NG (2)
Regulation RT DA,RT RT (1) DA,RT
Regulation Up DA,RT DA,RT DA
Regulation Down DA,RT DA,RT DA
Regulation (performance) RT NA
Regulation Up Mileage DA,RT DA,RT
Regulation Down Mileage DA,RT DA,RT
Regulation Service RT
Regulation movement DA,RT
Regulating Mileage DA,RT
Frequency response
Mandatory frequency response
Firm Frequency Response (dynamic) monthly tenders
Firm Frequency Response (static) monthly tenders
Spinning reserve DA,RT DA,RT DA,RT DA,RT
Ten-minute spinning reserve RT, F
Synchronised reserve RT
Responsive reserve DA
Non-spinning reserve DA,RT DA,RT DA
Ten-minute non-spinning reserve RT, F
Quick start RT
Thirty-minute operating reserve RT, F
Supplemental reserve (3) DA,RT RT (4) DA,RT
Ramp reserves (5) RT DA,RT
Reserve
BM startup
Fast reserve monthly tenders
Optional Reserve Services
Short term operating reserve (Committed) 3 tenders/y
Short term operating reserve (Flexible) 3 tenders/y
Short term operating reserve (Premium 
Flexible) 3 tenders/y
Reactive power (voltage support)
Mandatory reactive power service
Enhanced reactive power service (6) semestral tenders
Black start NA
market-based mechanisms  (tenders ) Markets : DA: Day Ahead, RT: Real  Time, F: Forward (pre-DA), NA: No avai lable 
other (cost-based, lost opportunity cost, revenue-based, mandatory)
(1): Regulation in PJM is  provided by a  combination of resources   fol lowing 2 s ignals : RegA (s low response) and RegD (quick response). 
(2): Simpl i fied l i s t of AS as  of Dec. 2017, (3): Provided by onl ine or off-l ine resources  in MISO/PJM, (4): PJM uses  a  day-ahead schedul ing reserve
 in addition to the RT for supplemental  reserve (30min),  (5): Ramp product: Up and Down Ramp Capabi l i ty (MISO), Flexible Ramping (CAISO).
(6): Not currently active for procurement. The ful l  l i s t of removed products  can be found at NG (2017c) and NG (2018c).
Source: Anaya and Pol l i tt (2017, p. 31 ), ISO-NE (2018a), NG (2017a), Potomac Economics  (2017).
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where more coordination between DSOs and TSOs is expected in the procurement of non-frequency 
ancillary services (e.g. voltage control, black start).  Reactive power at the distribution level is currently 
managed via connection agreements by limiting the values of PFs in agreement with the national or 
state regulation on Network Codes (i.e. Distribution Code in GB, Interconnection Handbook in 
California) and also through financial incentives. In the USA, the IEEE 1547 standard rules the 
Interconnection and Interoperability of DERs with electric power systems10. A major revision of this 
standard started in 2014 driven by the increase on DER penetration.  
 
2.3 Adaptation of Codes that favour Reactive Power Support 
 
Network Codes for grid connected generators are evolving in line with the integration of more 
renewable generation in the system and the need to maintain system security and stability. An 
example of this is the Network Codes that are being updated by different EU member countries as 
part of the implementation of the Third Package. These codes involve, among other things, the 
Requirements for Generators (RFG) connection code applicable only for new generating facilities. 
However, generators classified as “emerging technologies” do not need to comply with the RFG 
requirements (OFGEM, 2017). 
Under this code generators are subject to specific technical requirements arranged in four bands 
(Types A-D) based on the connection voltage (up to 110kV from Types A-C and over 110 kV for Type 
D) 11 and capacity (thresholds are proposed by national TSOs, ratified via industry consultation and 
approved by the regulatory authority)12. Reactive power capabilities are required for Types B-D (NG, 
2018b). In GB this capability is required for generators with at least 1 MW capacity (starting with Type 
B). Figure 1 illustrates the generator size band (and associated capacity by Nov. 2015) proposed in GB.  
Figure 1: Generation by band in Great Britain 
 
 
                                                          
10 See: https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/standard/1547-2018.html 
11 While Type A is the one with basic capabilities with limited automated response and minimal system operator 
control, Type D is specific for higher voltage connected generation with impact on control and operation of the 
entire system (EC, 2016).  
12RFG entered into force as European law on the 17 May 2016. In GB compliance with the code is required by 17 
May 2019. The Grid Code has been updated accordingly by 17 May 2018. In the case of distribution, the current 
Engineering Recommendations (ER) G83 and G59 will be updated and republished as G98 and G99 respectively.   
DNO ED1: refers to generators connected to the distribution network. TEC: refers to generators with transmission entry connection. 
Embedded: refers to generators connected to the distribution network with access rights to the transmission network.
Figures from Nov. 2015. (TEC, Embedded), week 24 2015 (DNO). Source: NG (2018a, p. 176).
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DNO ED1 TEC Embedded
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It is noted that the majority of distribution connected capacity in GB is placed in three bands (Types 
B-D) representing 88% of the total. However, in the future a reduction of this share is expected. By 
the end of 2021 most of new distribution connected capacity will be categorised within Type A and 
Type B representing around 67% of the total (NG, 2018a).  
 
2.4 The Role of DERs in Reactive Power Procurement 
Unlike transmission-connected generators, DERs in general are not necessarily required to provide 
reactive power support to control local voltage levels. In fact, DERs and their participation in organised 
wholesale markets has been concentrated on the provision of demand side response services (mainly 
from industrial and commercial businesses and most recently from residential customers) in energy, 
capacity and related ancillary services markets  (e.g. Demand Response Auction Mechanism - DRAM in 
California, Demand-Side Ancillary Service Program - DSASP and Demand-Ahead Demand Response 
Program-DADRP in New York, Power Responsive in GB) using both auctions and non-competitive 
mechanisms. As such, DRAM, a pay-as-bid auction, represents one of the pioneers in the use of DERs 
to aggregate demand response directly to the CAISO market using a market-based approach. In 
contrast with the traditional demand response practices, DRAM is procured by the electricity 
distribution utility (instead of the system operator). Through DRAM, IOUs make a capacity (also known 
as resource adequacy - RA) payment to demand response (DR) aggregators. IOUs acquire this capacity 
only and do not dispatch the resources. The IOUs are not allowed to claim revenues that can be 
received by the bidders (technically offerors) from the energy market. Box 1 provides further details 
of this initiative.  
Reactive power support from DERs is expected to take a more active role in this in the future. This is 
reflected by the introduction of new requirements such as those specified in Network Codes, the use 
of advanced technologies such as smart-inverters in DERs and the upward trend in DER capacity. 
According to Gandhi et al. (2018a) inverter efficiency is the most important parameter in the provision 
of reactive power by DERs. The increase of DER capacity and the decline of centralised generation 
imply that the use of DER capabilities will be important to support both transmission and distribution 
system reliability (NERC, 2017). Increasing levels of DER participation in the wholesale market, also 
imply the need for greater DER visibility by system operators (at the transmission level) and additional 
coordination between transmission system operators and electricity distribution firms (More than 
Smart, 2017). In addition, in regions with a high level of DER penetration, electricity distribution firms 
can become a source rather than sink of reactive power (AEMO, 2017b). DERs can also introduce 
additional system complexity. This implies that “trials” are required to measure and evaluate the 
effectiveness of DERs in providing reactive power and voltage support (Exelon Companies, 2016).  
3. Reactive Power: The International Experience 
 
This section evaluates the international experience in reactive power procurement by selected system 
operators: Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), National Grid from GB and four ISOs from the 
USA (CAISO, PJM, NYISO, ISO-NE).   
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 Box No 1: Demand Response Auction Mechanism (DRAM) 
 
1. Overview 
In December 2014, with decision D.14-12-024, the California Public Energy Commission (CPUC) 
approved the DRAM. This mechanism requires the three Investor Owned Utilities (IOUs) from 
California (SCE, SDG&E, PG&E) to design and implement pilot programs that promote the 
participation of third party demand response (DR) resources in the CAISO market. A specific target 
of DR capacity has been set for each IOU. There is a specific budget allocated to each IOU with 
annual figures between US$1.5m and US$6m. DRAM is composed of four pilots, the first three 
already procured with a total capacity over 365 MW, the last one is still ongoing. The delivery period 
varies across the pilots (DRAM 1: 6months, DRAM 2: 1year, DRAM 3: 2 years, DRAM 4: 1 year).  
2. About the products 
There are three types of eligible capacity products: system capacity, local capacity and flexible 
capacity. A subcategorization applies for flexible capacity. The DR products can be offered either as 
Proxy Demand Resource - PDR (in the day-ahead or real time market) or Reliability Demand 
Response Resource - RDRR (in the real-time market especially under emergency conditions) into 
the CAISO wholesale market. For flexible capacity offers must be bid as PDR. CPUC has established 
the prohibition of specific fossil generation for load reduction during demand response events.   
3. Participation criteria and eligibility 
Offers must be for a minimum of 100 kW per PDR or 500 kW per RDRR per month. The maximum 
number of offers per bidder is 20. Offers must contain a monthly quantity (capacity kW) and a 
contract price ($/kW-mo) for each applicable showing month. Bidders are allowed to vary the 
amount of capacity and price on a monthly basis. The minimum delivery period is one month and 
bidders are required to include deliveries in August. Bidders will get paid based on the contract 
price, product monthly capacity and on the type of service. Offers cannot exceed the long-term 
avoided cost of generation (set at US$113.20 kW-yr.) and are required to cover 20% from the 
residential sector. Offers for non-residential customer product are usually valued less than those 
with residential customer products.  
4. Evaluation criteria 
A common methodology has been used by the IOUs which involves a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative assessment (scoring matrix). Sample valuations (spreadsheet) are published by the 
3 IOUs in their respective RFO DRAM website.  IOUs evaluate their respective offers separately.  
Quantitative:  
a. Offers are ranked based on each offer’s net market value (NMV).  All cost and benefit figures 
are adjusted using the utility’s average cost of capital and discounted back to the date of 
evaluation results.  
𝑁𝑀𝑉 = 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 
b. Benefits are calculated for each offer using its forecast capacity market and the market value 
of each type of product (Product Value). Benefits are multiplied by 1.15 which reflects the 
Planning Reserve Margin credit given to demand response resources in the RA compliance 
process. Offered Volume (kW) and Product Value ($/kW) refer to monthly figures. 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 = ∑ 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 , where i=each product 
 
c. Costs are computed for each offer by the product of Offered Volume and Offered Pricing per 
product and per month. All costs are then added.  
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 = ∑ 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑖 ∗ 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑝𝑖=1 , where i=each product 
Qualitative:  
d. Qualitative factors affect only the Costs. The IOUs may weigh the standard criteria differently. 
Cost is adjusted based on the application of the qualitative factor adjustment (QFA). 
𝑄𝐹𝐴 (𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟) = 1 + ∑ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 (𝑗) ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 (𝑗)7𝑗=1 , where j=criteria 
 
Source: CPUC (2017a,b,c), PG&E(2017), SCE(2015, 2017, 2018), SDG&E(2017), SDG&E-PG&E-SCE (2018a,b).  
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3.1 Australia 
AEMO identifies three major categories of ancillary services: Frequency Control Ancillary Services 
(FCAS) Markets, Network Support and Control Ancillary Services (NSCAS) and System Restart Ancillary 
Services (SRAS). Voltage Control Ancillary Services (VCAS) is a sub category of the NSCAS that relates 
to reactive power services. NSCAS is classified as a “non-market service”, which means that these are 
not acquired by AEMO as part of the spot market (AEMC, 2018), in contrast with other ancillary 
services such as FCAS. Based on the Rule 2011 No.2 (AEMC, 2011), Transmission Network Service 
Providers (TNSP) have the primary responsibility for meeting the NSCAS needs in the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) starting on April 2012.  
If this gap (unmet ancillary services’ needs)13 remains unmet by the transmission operators, AEMO 
will seek tenders for reactive power providers under ancillary services agreements. AEMO acts as 
reactive power procurer of Last-Resort and will acquire these services only to ensure power system 
security and reliability of supply on the transmission networks. Transmission operators may acquire 
reactive power services under connection agreements or network support agreements (AEMC, 2018), 
however they aim first to make maximum use of the existing reactive resources.  
Procurement of reactive power under network support agreements is an option for reactive support 
beyond the performance standards (Transgrid, 2017). 
The trend costs of ancillary services for the period 2012-2017 is illustrated in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Trend of Ancillary Service costs in Australia 
 
A significant reduction of reactive power costs can be observed, in line with the National Electricity 
Amendment, Rule 2011. By the end of 2017 reactive power costs represented only around 5% of the 
                                                          
13 The gap is identified by AEMO in its National Transmission Network Development Plan (NTNDP) and is 
represented by the difference between the NSCAS needs of the NEM power system (arising within a 5-year 
horizon) and the NSCAS that the TNSPs predict to be procured.  
Annual figures: Jan.-Dec., FC: Frequency Control, Reg: Regulation, Cont: Contingency, RP: Reactive Power.
Source: AEMO AS Payments Summary - Annual Reports (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017). 
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total ancillary costs. The section below discusses the tender mechanism applied by AEMO for the 
procurement of NSCAS with a focus on reactive power services (VCAS).  
VCAS Tenders 
AEMO distinguishes mainly two kinds of VCAS modes of operation in the tender process for acquiring 
NSCAS: VCAS Generation Mode and VCAS Synchronous Condensor Mode. In Generation mode, VCAS 
represents the amount of reactive power capability (generation or absorption) by the NSCAS 
equipment in excess of the performance standard for reactive power for the NSCAS equipment 
supplied up to the connection point to the transmission network. In Synchronous Condensor Mode, 
refers to the reactive power capability (generation or absorption) when the generating unit is not 
producing active energy. The types of product are not limited by the operation modes of unused 
reactive power capacities of the generating units previously described. Other types of reactive plants 
can also compete such as capacitors and reactors14, SVC, STATCOMs, HVDC/HVAC transmission lines, 
etc. (AEMO, 2012). Participants are free to offer their best solution. However, some of the tender 
requirements may be more specific than others.      
The request for reactive power service may be for different term lengths (AEMO, 2012):  
a. short term: up to 12 months with the option to extend the service for 12 additional months, 
usually for existing facilities; 
b. long term: for a period of 5 year or longer, installations of new or utilisation of existing reactive 
plants; 
c. a combination of both, short term with existing installations until the construction of long term 
reactive power equipment.  
Depending on the mode, participants (with winning selected offers) are subject to specific payments, 
see Table 2.  There are two different payment structures based on the type of the generating unit 
operation mode. A compensation payment applies only when the generating unit is constrained off to 
generate or absorb reactive power during a trading interval. A Testing charge refers to the cost of 
specific tests that will be paid by AEMO. For additional details about the type of payments and their 
calculation see AEMO (2017a).  
Table 2: Payment Structure 
 
In the evaluation of the tenders, AEMO assess the optimal combination of reactive power services 
taking into consideration the locational effectiveness of each VCAS equipment (depicted in a map 
                                                          
14 If a transmission operator’s offer is selected to provide the required reactive power service using reactive 
equipment (i.e. reactors), after the contracting period this equipment may be included in the transmission 
operator’s regulatory asset base (RAB) with a zero capital value in the RAB. This was the case of Transgrid (that 
provided the lowest cost service) in the provision of NSCAS for voltage control in southern New South Wales 
(AEMO, 2018a).   
Mode Generation Mode Synchronous Condensor Mode
Price and payments
Availability charge - RP generation ✓
Availability charge - RP absorption ✓
Enabling charge ✓
Compensation payment ✓
Testing charge ✓ ✓
Source: AEMO (2017a) - NSCAS Agreement Generic Proforma.
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provided by AEMO) at the least cost possible. AEMO does not provide details of the evaluation criteria 
(quantitative or qualitative) but only a general list of the criteria to be taken into account.  
3.2 Great Britain 
In GB, National Grid, the transmission system operator, procures a larger number of ancillary services 
(in comparison with the SOs from the USA and Australia). A total of 22 ancillary services have been 
identified and different procurement methods are observed such as tenders, mandatory and bilateral 
agreements. The acquisition of reactive power ancillary services is based on three mechanisms: 
Obligatory Reactive Power Service (ORPS), Enhanced Reactive Power Service (ERPS) and Transmission 
Constraint Management (TCM). Reactive power can be provided by synchronous and non-
synchronous generators which are subject to different PF range requirements, 0.85 (lag)/0.95 (lead) 
and 0.95(lag/lead) respectively. Figure 3 depicts the trend of ancillary services costs in GB. There is an 
upward trend in total balancing service costs15. Reactive power ancillary service costs, represented 
mainly by those incurred under ORPS, are around £80m per year and represents circa 10% of total 
balancing service costs (average annual figures, 2013/14 – 2017/18)16. A description of the reactive 
power ancillary services is provided below.  
Figure 3: Trend of Ancillary Services Costs in GB 
 
 
ORPS relates to the capacity for absorbing or generating reactive power to manage system voltages. 
This is a mandatory service for transmission connected large generators (over 50 MW) that are subject 
to the Grid Code (CC 6.3.2). In agreement with majority of European countries (ENTSO-E, 2017), this 
is the most common approach for procuring reactive power services in GB. Generators under ORPS 
receive a default payment for utilisation (£/Mvarh) that is updated monthly in agreement with market 
                                                          
15 Balancing costs exclude transmission constraint costs, in line with the monthly reports from National Grid.  
16 Reactive power costs do not include those for managing voltage constraints, currently grouped in the 
‘constraints’ cost category which covers both: thermal (active power) and voltage constraints. Reactive power 
costs due to voltage constraints are around £50m per year (NG, 2018c).   
 
Balancing costs total
Source: National Grid monthly Balancing Services Summary, Office for National Statistics (ONS). 
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indicators (Schedule 3 of the CUSC)17. The default payment rate amounts to £3.19/Mvarh18. A 
mandatory service agreement (MSA) is required to be signed by generators for the provision of the 
ORPS. ORPS is the most common way to acquire reactive power services by National Grid. Over the 
last ten years, the requirement for reactive power absorption has increased (due to the downward 
trend in the demand for active power) and this trend is expected to continue (NG, 2018c). 
ERPS is procured via tenders and applies to generators whose reactive capability exceeds the 
minimum technical requirements of ORPS. Tenders are held every six months and the delivery period 
is for a minimum of 12 months and thereafter in 6 month increments. The evaluation criteria for the 
selection of offers are set in the CUSC and considers economics (market price versus default price), 
intrinsic capability value (tendered reactive service versus alternative of National Grid reactive assets), 
among other things. Generators with winning offers receive the following payments: a capability price 
(£/Mvar/h), and/or a synchronised capability price (£/Mvar/h), and/or a utilisation price (£/Mvar/h)19. 
In contrast with ORPS which guarantees a default payment set through a formula, this mechanism has 
not been successful in the last years. No generator has provided reactive power under a Market 
contract since 2009. The percentage of total Mvar lagging capability with Market Agreements has 
been reduced from 70% (highest peak in Oct. 2000) to only 6% in Oct. 2008 (NG, 2017b).  According 
to National Grid, one of the reasons is that ERPS competes with ORPS. The other could be the cap 
applied to the total funding for reactive power provision (Energy UK, 2017).  
National Grid has released the Reactive Power Roadmap (NG, 2018c), and proposes the rationalisation 
(Stage 1) and simplification (Stage 2) of the current services for procuring reactive power. Based on 
this, National Grid is planning to submit a proposal (to CUSC) to remove ERPS.  
TCM provides an ad-hoc solution. A transmission constraint can arise for different reasons (related to 
voltage or thermal constraints). A bilateral agreement is usually applied for contracting voltage 
support from generators using TCM, however constraint management tenders are also a way to 
procure it if there is sufficient competition20. 
 
3.3   United States  
 
System operators from the USA procure different kinds of ancillary services, however those that are 
subject to competitive mechanisms are those grouped under the regulation and reserve categories, 
see Table 1 for further details. Many of these services are co-optimised with energy. Reactive power 
is usually managed using the mandatory approach, which means that generators are required to 
provide reactive power support within their mandatory PF range specified in the interconnection 
requirement.PF requirements vary across ISOs and depend also on the type of generating facility. In 
CAISO and PJM synchronous large (>20 MW) and small (<=20 MW) generators are required to adjust 
their PF within the range of 0.90 lead and 0.95 lag (CAISO, 2017; PJM, 2018). In NYISO and ISO-NE the 
                                                          
17 The rate is estimated based on an indexation factor that includes a wholesale power index. The last is a 
combination of three different power indexes (Heren, Petroleum Argus, Platts), see CUSC Schedule 3, Appendix 
1. 
18 Average figure for the period Jan. – Jul. 2017 (NG-UK Power Networks, 2017a).  
19 See: https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/balancing-services/reactive-power-services/enhanced-
reactive-power-service 
20 See: https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/electricity/balancing-services/system-security-services/transmission-
constraint-management 
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same PF requirement (0.95 lag/lead) is required for large/small synchronous (NYISO, 2017a; ISO-NE, 
2017). Across all the ISOs, the same PF requirement applies for non-synchronous generating facilities.  
Based on FERC Order 827, new non-synchronous generation are required to provide dynamic reactive 
power within the range of 0.95 lead/lag at the high-side at the generator substation21. 
 
In terms of payments, a multi-part payment (composed of capability, loss opportunity costs and other 
payments) applies for reactive power service provision, in agreement with the Schedule 2 of the ISOs’ 
tariffs.  However, generators are not always compensated in the same way. CAISO, the California 
System Operator, is the only one that does not compensate for the installation of reactive power 
capability (even for non-synchronous generators) because capability payments are not applied22. This 
is supported by the fact that in California there are no centralised capacity markets but bilateral 
contracts for capacity (i.e. Resource Adequacy). This allows generators to reflect in their costs 
associated with energy, capacity and ancillary services. Then, providing capability payments would 
result in double payment for reactive power and hence double charging for reactive power to load 
serving entities (PG&E, 2015). The rest of ISOs compensate generators using different methods, such 
as a fixed rate (NYISO, ISO-NE) and  the American Electric Power - AEP methodology23 (supported by 
FERC) used by PJM. AEP is a fixed-cost recovery approach and generators are required to submit the 
appropriate fillings to FERC for the evaluation of the cost-based revenue requirement for supplying 
reactive power.  Based on this, NYISO and ISO-NE have set the compensation payments at US$ 
2,747.61/Mvar/year (NYISO, 2018) and US$ 1,113.88/Mvar/year (ISO-NE, 2018b) respectively for 
201824.  
 
Loss opportunity cost is the other type of payment which is only applicable when generating resources 
operate outside their mandatory range. The four ISOs make this kind of compensation. NYISO defines 
this type of costs as: “The Lost Opportunity Cost payment shall be calculated as the maximum of zero 
or the difference between: (i) the product of: (a) the appropriate MW of output reduction and (b) the 
Real-Time Locational Base Marginal Price (LBMP) at the Generator bus; and (ii) the Generator’s Energy 
Bid for the reduced output of the Generator multiplied by the time duration of reduction in hours or 
fractions thereof” (NYISO, 2014). The two other payments are related to the cost of energy consumed 
or produced by generating units and non-generator reactive resources for the purpose of providing 
reactive power services.   
Table 3 shows the different procurement methods and type of remuneration that reactive power 
providers can get for offering their services in selected system operators’ jurisdictions.  
 
 
                                                          
21See: https://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2016/061616/E-1.pdf 
22 The other ISO that does not compensate for reactive capability is SPP, however this is not part of this study.  
23 The AEP methodology has three main components associated with the production of reactive power: (1) the 
generator and its exciter, (2) accessory electric equipment that supports the operation of the generator-exciter 
and (3) the remaining total production investment required to provide real power and operate the exciter. The 
methodology also applies an allocation factor (Mvar2/MVA2) to sort annual revenues requirements of these 
components between real and reactive power (FERC, 2005, p. 8).  
24 Both figures (capacity payment/costs) refer to adjusted values. NYISO uses the customer index price (CPI) 
while ISO-NE uses a specific formula, see ISO-NE (2018, Schedule 2) for further details.  
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Table 3: Reactive Power Procuring and Payment Methods: A Comparison 
 
 
4. The Power Potential Initiative: A New Market for Reactive Power   
The Power Potential project is a customer funded initiative that proposes the creation of a Reactive 
Power market using DERs and additional capacity in the South East Region of the UK25. The 
transmission network has reached its capacity in this area (limited by dynamic voltage stability and 
thermal capacity). The Power Potential project will alleviate the problem by procuring resources 
reactive power and active power services from different kinds of distributed energy, using a market-
based mechanism. Savings to energy customers has been estimated over £412m by 2050 (based on 
its potential implementation at 59 sites across GB) and up to 3.7 GW of additional connected capacity 
in this region. The project runs from January 2017 to December 2019 and the auction trial period is 
due to start no later than March 2019. Further details are provided in the following sections.  
4.1   What is auctioned? 
 
The Power Potential project is soliciting offers from DERs to provide reactive power services (dynamic 
voltage support) and active power support (for constraint management and system balancing) in the 
South-East of England. DERs are expected to be connected ideally at 33 KV or above for most 
effectiveness (NG-UK Power Networks, 2018a). National Grid has identified four Grid Supply Points 
(GSPs) and their respective served areas where both reactive power and active power services are 
required. There is no limitation in the size of the resource (synchronous or non-synchronous) that can 
be offered but it is expected at least 500Kvar for reactive power and/or 500 KW for active power, for 
both portfolio resources (aggregation) and directly contracted resources. A capability to provide 0.95 
PF lagging or leading (equivalent to 32% of the maximum export capacity) is required, among other 
characteristics (NG- UK Power Networks, 2018b). However Power Potential has ruled out curtailing 
MWs of DERs in order to increase Mvar.  
According to National Grid, some products can be mutually exclusive. For instance, active power and 
NG’s balancing services cannot be provided simultaneously, or at least active power should be 
provided outside of any period when the generators have already been contracted for the provision 
of the balancing service. This is due to the risk of potentially nullifying actions. A list of NG’s Balancing 
Services and their compatibility to work simultaneously with reactive power and active power services 
has been provided (NG-UK Power Networks, 2018c).   
                                                          
25 The total costs of the project amounts to £10.1m, Networks (NG-UK Power Networks, 2017b).   
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4.2 How to be involved 
 
DER participants (including aggregators) are subject to specific pre-qualification and testing before 
taking part of the trial (only for reactive power service).  After being selected, DERs will subject to two 
different stages (Wave 1 and Wave 2). The third stage (Wave 3) is when DERs and traditional 
transmission-connected generators compete from a BAU approach. Wave 1 and 2 are funded from 
Power Potential budget and Wave 3 from National Grid BAU budget.  
Wave 1 aims to demonstrate the technical solution. In this wave, DERs participate on a non-
competitive basis. Wave 1 involves simulating and measuring DER speed of response to voltage change 
and measuring effectiveness of DER delivery at each GSP. In order to encourage the participation of 
DERs in the trial, they will receive a fixed fee for fixed number of hours for their participation in this 
first stage regardless of the size of DERs (up to £45,000 per site if this is available for over 1,850 hours 
of the Wave 1 window during the trial year). This would help to reduce the net investment that DERs 
may be required to do for the acquisition of control and communication equipment, in order to 
participate in the trial. Some equipment will be provided by the project, but others need to be 
acquired by the DERs (i.e. communication and control capital costs per DERs).   
Wave 2 aims to evaluate the financial viability of Power Potential. In this wave DERs compete with 
each other and the market is run for at least 1,800 hours during the trial period which will be achieved 
by running auctions across a period made up of 17 weeks (auctions may not be daily and will consider 
weekends). DERs (with winning offers) will receive two kinds of payments as a result of winning in the 
procurement auction: a secured availability payment (£/Mvar/h) and a potential utilisation payment 
(£/Mvarh). There is no cap set for either payments, however bids will be assessed against the 
alternative cost of reinforcing the network (i.e. the counterfactual being explored in wave 2 is whether 
DERs can provide reactive support more efficiently than the installation of reactive equipment on the 
transmission network). It has been decided that DERs will compete in day-ahead auctions, though they 
can choose not to alter their offers daily. 
Offers from DERs can be received from different types of resources that are able to provide reactive 
and active power services in the area covered by at least one of the GSP specified by National Grid26. 
Heatmaps are available to inform participants of the location of the GSP that would be more suitable 
for them. Offers can be made only for one GSP at the same time. Simultaneous offers to different GSPs 
are not allowed. The submission of offers, will be via a UK Power Networks platform (web portal). The 
size of reactive and active power services to be procured has been estimated between 10-50Mvar 
across all of the GSPs. The delivery period will not exceed 24 hours. Bids are expected to be submitted 
for four-hourly periods, which means a total of 6 period per day (NG-UK Power Networks, 2018d).   
                                                          
26 As of April 2018, National Grid and UK Power Networks have already received 13 submissions to provide 
reactive power services in 18 sites, with reactive power volumes up to 79.3 Mvar (lead) and 69.3 Mvar (lag). The 
majority of DERs are from PV solar, followed by battery storage (NG-UK Power Networks, 2018c). National Grid 
is expecting around 15 DERs for the trial.  
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4.3    About the evaluation criteria and eligibility 
 
Reactive and active power services will be procured through a market mechanism in day-ahead 
auctions27 using the pay-as-bid methodology28. The idea is to select the offers based on a combination 
of both lowest costs and highest effectiveness but limited to the current budget (around £0.6m for 
both Wave 1 and Wave 2). NG will forecast the reactive and active power services to be procured for 
each GSP and will instruct the Distributed Energy Resource Management System (DERMS)29 about this. 
The DERMS will evaluate the resources available (free capacity) at the lowest cost based as NG’s 
instructions. DERs will then be instructed by the DERMS about the services to be provided at set 
points30. Non-cost variables have not been taken into account in the evaluation criteria.  
5. Discussion and Lessons Learned 
5.1 Procurement of reactive power and the need for market-based 
mechanisms  
 
The use of market-based mechanisms in the procurement of reactive power is practically non-existent 
globally. This is in contrast with other ancillary services such as frequency regulation and capacity 
reserves that are usually co-optimised with energy in day-ahead and/or real time market. Provision of 
reactive power by third parties (mainly generators) is generally managed under a mandatory approach 
(within a specific range of PFs that can vary depending on the type of generator). Generators are 
usually compensated using a fixed methodology (e.g. a flat compensation rate or a cost-based 
methodology) without any market determined prices. Other compensation schemes such the 
payment for loss opportunity cost, which include local marginal prices, happen under “very infrequent 
circumstances” (EPSA, 2016, p.5). This means that in CAISO (where capability payments do not exist 
when generators operate within the PF range), generators are basically not compensated at all. This 
is an extreme case. There is also a risk of over-compensation or under-compensation when a fixed 
methodology is applied. For instance, even though a competitive market exists in GB, transmission-
connected generators prefer to get the default payment under OPRS (£4.34/Mvarh, average price for 
period Jan-Jul. 2017) rather than participate in the ERPS market. In other markets where a flat rate 
applies (NYSISO and ISO-NE) and all generators receive the same compensation rate regardless of the 
technology and associated costs, there are also concerns that those markets undercompensate certain 
generators for the provision of reactive power (EPSA, 2016, p.5), especially in comparison with the 
AEP methodology31.  
                                                          
27 Each day ahead auction is looking to procure services for the following 24 hour period. Specific windows will 
be set within this period.   
28 According to National Grid pay-as-bid is the current method used by them and is already well-known by market 
participants. 
29 The DERMS run by UK Power Networks, is the Power Potential platform that facilitates the communication 
between National Grid and DERs connected to UK Power Networks. It was developed by ZIV Automation.  
30 For instance, for reactive power National Grid may set different periods (from 2 hour to 7 hour windows) 
over the day. See: 
https://www.nationalgrid.com/sites/default/files/documents/Power%20Potential%20webinar%20summary_S
eptember%202017.pdf.   
31 As an example of the inequality of these two methodologies: A wind generator that provides 200Mvar (lagging 
and leading) of reactive power capability from a 200 MW plant (with 0.9 PF) would be compensated for this 
capability differently. It would receive per year US$0 (CAISO), US$225k (ISO-NE), US$525k (NYISO), and US$ 1.9m 
(PJM). In the first one reactive capability is not compensated at all (EDF Renewable, 2016). 
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The AEP methodology (a FERC approved cost-based revenue methodology) based their estimations 
on the generators’ investments for reactive capability and the nameplate capacity is used for 
measuring this. A key observation on this methodology is the potential degradation of the nameplate 
output overtime, which translates to lower output in reactive power support. According to EPSA 
(2016), as the cost of equipment (which sets the cost-based rates) does not vary regardless of the 
reduction of the nameplate output due to degradation, then it is not appropriate to use the 
degradation in production to vary the reactive compensation received by suppliers. A different point 
is made by FERC by suggesting asking for testing in order to verify any potential degradation in the 
reactive power output of the generators. FERC has found that this happens in fact (FERC, 2018b, p.4). 
The other observation is that AEP was initially developed for synchronous generators however its 
application has been expanded for all type of generators, including non-synchronous (i.e. wind 
turbines). Investment for reactive power for wind generators can be higher in non-synchronous 
generators than in synchronous generators with the same nameplate capacity, especially in terms of 
more turbines and generator/exciters (FERC, 2018c). However, the installation of this additional 
equipment brings a higher level of reliability to provide reactive supply (EDF Renewable, 2016). This 
suggests that the AEP methodology should be able to allow the recovery of all the costs related to the 
provision of reactive power regardless of the type of resource.   
The risk of over-compensation or under-compensation for reactive power capability using a fixed 
methodology can be mitigated by introducing more market-based solutions. The proliferation of more 
DERs can help to deal with the poor locational effectiveness that is observed when the resource is 
placed far from the point where reactive power services are required (Vars do not travel well). DER 
reactive power capabilities will also improve, in line with the upgrade of Network Codes and standards 
(i.e. IEEE 1547). Then, DERs may constitute an important source of reactive power support for the 
system grid. Procuring reactive power from DERs will also require greater interaction between DERs, 
electricity distribution utilities and TSOs. 
The use of a market-based approach using DERs for reactive power services represents one more 
channel to procure this type of ancillary service. The use of fixed methodologies for compensating 
reactive power capability will continue in organised wholesale markets. However, it is expected that 
an enhanced methodology reflects the costs of providing reactive power services taking into 
consideration the nature of generators.  
 
5.2 A Market-Based Approach for Reactive Power: The Conceptual Auction 
Design  
 
The centrality in auction design of encouraging new entry and more participants in the auction. 
According to Klemperer (2002) a good auction should aim to attract entry, prevent collusion and 
predatory behaviour. New initiatives in auction design for reactive power procurement encourage 
new entrants (i.e. DERs) and more market participants in the supply of reactive power services (DERs 
plus transmission connected resources). However, in the future the participation of new entrants 
should depend on whether it can compete (in terms of prices) with the traditional transmission-
connected resources or other future options. It is also important for repeated procurement auctions 
to be designed in a way that incumbent suppliers do not start by offering predatory (below cost) prices 
in the early auctions in order to deter entrants and / or then begin coordinating their offers with each 
other in order to raise outturn prices in the longer run. 
 
  18 
   
 
The importance of enhancing competition between the reactive power suppliers (i.e. DERs) across the 
different supply sites (i.e. GSPs) via a package auction design. Ausubel and Cramton (2011) suggest 
that auctions should aim to enhance substitution if multiple objects are for sale, encourage price 
discovery and induce truthful bidding. A joint auction allows a higher combination of products 
enhancing competition via substitution between reactive power suppliers.  This would be a more 
complex auction design than for example the Power Potential initiative, however total procurement 
cost could be lower by selecting the combinations that maximise social welfare (discussed further 
below). In so-called second-price auction, the market clearing price is determined by the next highest 
bid after last supplier selected to supply. 
 
Consideration of pay-as-clear price32 determination format and the incorporation of a quality 
dimension. In general, auction theory suggests that second-price auctions33 are better than pay-as-bid 
as a way of determining prices (Krishna, 2009). Pay-as-bid is an approach that is well-known by system 
operators (National Grid, CAISO) and market participants. While pay-as-bid can promote generally 
lower prices in the short run (Holt, 1980), its lack of transparency on true costs may reduce dynamic 
efficiency relative to pay-as-clear. It can also bias the equilibrium price and risk inefficiency. In 
economic theory, a second-price auction would work better for true price discovery with higher 
dynamic efficiency in comparison with pay-as-bid. In addition, the objective of a procurement auction 
is not only to minimise the price paid but to maximise economic welfare. The consideration of quality 
dimensions in the procurement process (represented by the locational effectiveness of reactive 
power) should be a part of good auction design.   
 
Consideration should be given to the penalty scheme and the pricing format for reactive power supply 
(availability + utilisation). It could be the case that non delivery penalty affects the availability payment 
only. However due to the new requirements for DERs (Grid Code GC0100), reactive capability is going 
to be compulsory. This implies only a utilisation payment is necessary. This is something that would 
need to be taken into account when contemplating the large-scale of market-based trials such as the 
one discussed in this study. On the other hand, penalties could be mitigated by reducing the risks of 
having DERs with poor delivery. The use of non-cost variables in the evaluation of DERs can help with 
this. The scoring matrix from DRAM sets a good reference for the identification of these variables.  
 
The frequency and periodicity of the auction and the cost benefit of nearer to real time procurement 
and co-optimisation. More frequent auctions allow both parties (suppliers and the system operator) 
to adjust the reactive power offers and demand in nearly real time. According to Ahmadimanesh and 
Kalantar (2017), reactive power can be implemented under different time frames but getting closer 
to real time consumption might create local market power issues which would need to be managed. 
Market power may be significant because local reactive power constraints limit competition however 
this could be mitigated by a potentially high number of DERs. Shorter trading periods can help to 
reduce ancillary services costs by allowing similar trading periods for each ancillary service (reactive 
                                                          
32 Also known as “uniform-price” or “single-price”. 
33 Second price auctions are ones in which winning bidders are paid the price of marginal losing bidder who 
would have had to take if a given winning bidder had not been in the auction. Pay-as-clear auctions (where the 
marginal winning bid sets the price) approximate to second price auctions in conditions where each individual 
bidder is small and where the difference between the marginal winning bidder and marginal losing bidder is 
small. 
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power in this case) and the energy market. This is the case of other ancillary services such as frequency 
regulation and reserves which are procured with energy (day ahead and real time) in specific 
jurisdictions. This practice is referred to as co-optimisation and may result in important system costing 
savings.  
 
The careful specification of the counterfactual against which the auction results are to be evaluated. 
Reactive power can be acquired through auctions but also via transmission or distribution reactive 
equipment or through other future options (identifying and despatching of a specific DER using a 
similar approach to the current mandatory mechanism, offering a fixed price to DERs for reactive 
power). Running a reactive power auction mechanism for a small number of supply sites (i.e. GSPs) 
could be costly.   
 
The design of the contract between the DSO and TSO to incentivise optimal risk sharing. With the 
implementation of market-based initiatives for reactive power procurement using DERs, the DSO 
assumes a new role that may expose it to a significant energy price risk (unlike now). Proper 
contractual agreements are required to incentivise DSOs to optimise their provision of reactive power 
(and other ancillary services) (see Kim et al., 2017).  
 
5.3 About Power Potential Initiative  
 
Power Potential is an opportunity to trial the technical solution (DERMS implementation, DER local 
effectiveness, DER response time to voltage change), the commercial solution (represented by the 
avoided cost of transmission reinforcement for reactive power compensation), new roles (DNO as a 
facilitator for the procurement of reactive power and its transition to a DSO, the TSO as a contractor 
of reactive power services from distribution companies) and new interactions (between DNOs and the 
TSO and the need to coordinate in order to capture whole system benefits). Power Potential could 
also help to identify any regulatory barrier that may limit the value of the competitively procured 
reactive power from DERs and its large-scale implementation. 
 
A centralised market for reactive power is not currently an option due to the poor capability of reactive 
power to travel long distances. A regional or more decentralised market, rather than the centralised 
one, would be much more viable especially due to the upward trend of DERs. In the context of Power 
Potential these regional markets can be represented by a group of grid supply points (in this case four 
GSPs).  
6. Conclusions  
Globally, there is a lack of competitive mechanisms in the procurement of reactive power at both the 
transmission and the distribution level, in comparison with the procurement of other ancillary 
services. Instead, reactive power tends to be compensated by administratively determined pricing 
methodologies (involving fixed rates or cost-recovery) for procuring reactive power. This means that 
reactive power suppliers are likely to be over or under compensated. The introduction of more market 
oriented mechanisms and resources (such as DERs) for acquiring reactive and active power services 
by the system operator opens new opportunities and new ways to deal with voltage stability issues. 
This also imposes new challenges such as the implementation of new types of agreements (apart from 
the traditional ones) between DERs/system operator/electricity distribution firm and the use of new 
platforms to manage reactive power.  
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Power Potential is a first of its kind in seeking to competitively procure reactive power from DERs. It 
offers the opportunity to trial not only the DER performance in the provision of reactive and active 
power but also an innovative procurement mechanism design. This paper provides key 
recommendations for such a design drawing on general lessons from auction theory and practice.  
 
Our discussion of the principles of mechanism design would suggest that attention is given to the 
following. First, the frequency of the auction and its price determination mechanism offers significant 
scope for learning what sort of price resolution might be necessary/desirable or possible. Second, 
consideration of the use of pay-as-clear (rather than pay-as-bid) helps to reveal information about 
underlying costs and to experiment with a different (and arguably superior) payment rule. Third, more 
consideration of how to enhance substitutability of products within the trail area should be given, 
particularly by integrating the procurement across a regional market that can be represented by a 
group of reactive power multiple grid supply points (4 GSPs in the case of Power Potential). 
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